SubscribeThe Security Service (MI5) website currently advises that "the likelihood of a CBR (Chemical, Biological or Radiological) attack remains low".
(1) However, in June 2003 the Director General of that organisation, Eliza Manningham-Buller, warned that "it will only be a matter of time before a crude version of a CBRN attack is launched at a major Western city". (2) In recognition of the potential consequences of such an event much has been done to improve the UK's ability to respond to terrorist use of CBR weapons, but as we continue to develop our resilience capabilities against this threat the gradually increasing provision of CBR detection, identification and monitoring (DIM) equipment is generating a concomitant training challenge.
The breadth of the CBR threat in terms of both potential agents of harm and the possible means of delivery is of itself a major obstacle to ensuring an appropriate and sufficient response to its use, and dictates the need for a broad range of technical resource to be provided to emergency responders. In terms of DIM equipment the police, fire and ambulance services now possess a diverse array of devices in reflection of their differing operational responsibilities at the scene of a CBR event.
For the police this could prove to be a double edged sword, in that they have access to equipment that will enable them to more comprehensively address the spectrum of CBR threat, but they are also faced with the difficulties of delivering DIM equipment training across a greatly increased technical platform. The requirement to maintain 5% of UK police personnel as CBRN trained will create a considerable increase on the workload of the Police National CBRN Centre and individual constabularies in respect of DIM equipment training.
For the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) the supply of new radiation detection equipment under ODPM's New Dimensions program (3) has required that FRS personnel be provided with updated equipment training. The further delivery of regionally distributed specialist CBR DIM equipment packages (4) will also carry an increased and ongoing training burden. Initial training and re-training issues will similarly affect NHS ambulance and A&E personnel who have been widely supplied with new dose-rate/contamination monitors for use in radiation incidents. (5)
With specific regard to DIM equipment a Metropolitan Police Service report of February this year noted that, at a time when the service was voicing concern about future funding for CBRN activities, "additional costs are incurred where "training has to be purchased from the manufacturer to ensure staff are trained and capable to use the equipment within the manufacturers specifications". (6) When considered with the fact that correct use of multiple instrument types must be disseminated and repeated across large numbers of responders who each have their own individual operational procedures to incorporate and training standards to adhere to, it is clear that the only realistic option is for emergency service organisations to carry out their own training.
Whilst questions remain as to whether the government should be providing greater central funding for the DIM equipment necessary to meet a major CBR attack, there appears to be little evidence of any co-ordinated effort to optimise the use of the equipment supplied to date by ensuring the availability of systems designed specifically for this purpose.
The extreme hazard to personnel and the environment presented by CBR substances means that training with real threat materials is undesirable, especially in the urban environments where terrorists strike and responders need to practice their procedures, but real radiation DIM instruments will only respond to real radioactive sources, and the use of chemical and biological simulants with their respective DIM devices is, at best, problematic.
As an alternative to using real equipment, electronic simulation of DIM instruments has been available for nearly two decades. In the U.K. the British Transport Police (BTP) have been at the forefront of its use to ensure CBR response personnel can safely learn what real DIM instruments look, feel and sound like and how, for example, to differentiate between real CBR substances and sources of false positive response without the risk of using "live agent".
Procedures for such as CBR search, survey and decontamination activity are honed in the setting of their actual working environment, where scenarios can be rapidly set up in buildings, underground and outside in any weather conditions. Once the exercise parameters have been designed it is a simple matter to consistently repeat them whenever required.
BTP instructors use this technology to deliver training that ensures students are fully familiar with the correct set-up and use of DIM instruments, and they are able to record any trainee errors in the use of their equipment for auditable and irrefutable after action review.
Remotely controlled activation of simulated equipment faults provides BTP personnel with the opportunity to learn critical fault diagnosis and remedial action skills that cannot be easily taught with functioning DIM devices. Use of this technology also ensures that BTP avoids expensive depletion of consumables and damage to real DIM equipment so that it is available when needed in an emergency.
Together with the few police forces that have purchased electronic DIM simulation instruments from their own limited resources, BTP remain the exception rather than the rule in regard of optimising their ability train in the use of DIM equipment by this means.
Under the duty of care it is incumbent on the management of emergency service and other front line response organisations to ensure that personnel have the ability to use DIM equipment competently under the stress of a real event, but whilst the technical means to safely create realistic scenarios in which these skills can be learnt and practiced already exist, the use of such simulation equipment remains sporadic.
© Argon Electronics LLP 2006
(1) http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page46.html
(2) http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page210.html
(3) See Paul Matthewman and Peter Goulden "Mass Decontamination", p.24-25, Firefighter Magazine, November 2005.
(4) http://www.romar.org.uk/page148adim.html
(5) http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2006/060223/09.htm
